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COMMUNITY, CONSTITUTION, AND CULTURE:
THE CASE OF THE JEWISH KEHILAH*
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg**
David N. Myers***

What are the legal consequences of viewing cultural and
religious identity-Jewish identity in particular-not in static
terms, but as an evolving human artifact subject to the
dynamic forces of history? What implications are to be drawn
if we understand the supposed "essence" of religious and
cultural identity as nothing but a projection of our current,
fleeting self-perceptions? Animating these questions is the
recent insight of cultural anthropologists that the self-definition of a community emerges out of a perpetual contest for
cultural authority in which the terms of identity are constantly
challenged and revised.' This insight breaks down the
distinction between internal and external cultural forces,
between an "essential" current, hermetically sealed off from
the outside, and a set of well-defined extraneous forces whose
movements can be recorded accurately. The impulse to erode
this dichotomy stems from a dissatisfaction with, and lack of
confidence in, the analytical tools for measuring the influence
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See generaly JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TwEwrEi-CEUR
1.
ETHNOGRAPHY, LrTERATURE, AND ART (1988); THE INVENTION OF ETHNICrTY (Werner Sollors
ed., 1989 GEORGE R MARCUS & MICHAEL MJ. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRImQU
AN ExPERAL MOMENT INTHE HUMAN SCIENCES (1986), WRT NG CuLluRE: THE POeIcs
AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986) [hereinafter
WRITING CULTURE]. Some legal scholars have adopted this anti-essentialist perspective
on cultural identity. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politicsof the Closet: Towards Equal
Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian,andBisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915,933-63 (1989);
Angela P. Harris,Race and Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
608-17 (1990); Martha Minow, Identities,3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97,98-99 (1991); Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the FederalCourts, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 671, 705-19 (1989).
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of one cultural entity upon another. The idea that Jewishness,
for example, has been defined and redefined by accommodations
to "external," that is, non-Jewish, forces challenges the very
existence of an immanent Jewish culture. Conversely, if one
recognizes that Jewishness has been subject to competing
"internal" definitions, then it becomes difficult to speak of a
singularly authentic cultural essence.
The problems encountered by the traditional model of influence
have led some to a new model of cultural "polyphony" in which
external and internal influences are indistinguishable from
one another.2 This new polyphonic model is germane not only
to the realm of historical interpretation, but to the normativelegal arena as well. In the absence of fixed cultural identities,
separated by sharp boundary lines and transgressed by clear
vectors of causation or cultural influence, the basis for
challenging "cultural imperialism" or forced assimilation becomes
unclear. By the same token, it becomes questionable which,
if any, of the dynamic interactions that continually constitute
and reconstitute a cultural group (or subgroup) should be singled
out for defense. The anti-essentialist view of culture calls into
question the very notion of cultural "influence." In so doing,
it undermines the basis for condemning "interference" in the
processes of forming cultural identity-even if that "interference"
comes from the state.
Yet, while questioning the ability to identify interference in
cultural formation, the anti-essentialist perspective also calls into
question the neutrality of the principles of individualism and
universalism upon which state activity usually is justified.
Jewish history provides an example of an institution imbued with
a sense of communal unity and cultural particularism, the
kehilah, which could not survive the official implementation of
an individualistic and universalistic principle of tolerance. This
semiautonomous communal form emerged as the characteristic
vehicle of Jewish self-expression and self-regulation in medieval
and early modern Europe. Throughout this period, the kehilah
reflected the political subordination by and dependence of the
Jews, as a group, on their Gentile "hosts." Most importantly,
it represented a holistic form ofexistence in which the boundaries

2.
See, e.g., James Clifford, Introductionto WRITING CULTURE, supra note 1, at 1,
15-17.
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between political regulation, religion, culture, and law were
blurred, and the individual always was regarded, first and
foremost, as a member of the group.3
The very "groupness" of the traditional Jewish way of life,
in combination with the particularism of its culture and creed,
made its survival impossible in the emerging modern world
order without drastic reformulation. As the nature of political
fealty was redefined in the postfeudal era of the nation-state,
Jews were confronted with a seemingly Mephistophelian
bargain. They could reject their traditional ways in exchange
for the abstract, universal rights of the individual citizen, or
they could be, as they often were, disenfranchised as a
collectivity.
The withholding of citizenship rights generally and justifiably
is regarded as the mark of an intolerant regime. Conversely,
the extension of individual rights to Jews and others-the
promise of emancipation-has been seen as the hallmark of
a liberal and tolerant order. But the underlying quid pro quo
of assimilation for rights suggests that the liberal promise of
emancipation somehow excluded traditional Jewish identity
and faith. Jewish life could continue under a regime of liberal
tolerance, but only in the private realm. The resulting bifurcation of public and private selves was itself inconsistent with
the holism of premodern Jewish existence, and thus it only
served to accentuate the paradox of liberalism's "tolerant"
embrace.
Over time, these normative issues inevitably have been
translated into legal claims. Scholars increasingly pose the
question of whether constitutional principles of tolerance and
religious liberty should be interpreted to recognize "group
rights."4 More specifically, they ponder the validity of a group

See infra text accompanying notes 6-27.
3.
4.
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 12-14 (1983) (exhibiting tension between a so-called "paideic" law, characteristic of
particularistic groups, and "imperial" law, which attempts to mediate among diverse
groups on the basis of general principles of liberalism); Ronald R. Garet, Communality
and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1983) (constructing
a philosophical argument for recognizing group, as distinguished from both social and
individual, rights and applying the argument to the context of religion); Robert C. Post,
CulturalHeterogeneity and Law: Pornography,Blasphemy, and the FirstAmendment,
76 CAL. L. REv. 297, 299-305 (1988) (contrasting assimilationism, pluralism, and
individualism); Mark Tushnet, The ConstitutionofReligion,18 CONN. L. REV. 701,729-38
(1986) (arguing for the substitution of a more republican approach, one of mutual
forbearance, for the prevailing liberal individualist approach to religion).
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right against state-promoted assimilation.5 These propositions
raise the question: what is the basis for a complaint against
assimilation if every particular form of cultural identity is
simply the manifestation of a temporary victory in the ongoing
struggle for cultural definition?
This Article seeks not to answer these questions, but simply
to pose them in a historical, as well as a legal-theoretical,
context. Part I describes the historical development of the
Jewish kehilah, its subsequent evolution, and eventual
dissolution. Part II surveys recent trends in legal scholarship
which reflect a growing consciousness of the tension between
the demands of self-conscious cultural groups and liberal legal
principles.

I. THE JEWISH KEHILAH

In its transition from an autonomous social, religious, and
legal entity to a purely voluntary association without coercive
power over its members, the Jewish communal organization,
known by the Hebrew "kehilah,"illuminates the tension between
the ideal of tolerance within a liberal society and the claims
of a subgroup within that society to self-expression and selfregulation. 6 The roots of the kehilah's transformation parallel-or,

5.
See Post, supra note 4, at 299-305. Opposition to assimilation is a prominent
theme in critical feminist legal scholarship. See, eg., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 9 (1987); Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out
of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate,86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118,1163-70 (1986); Alison
M. Jagger, Sexual Difference andSexual Equality,in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE 239,249-51 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence,95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1393-99 (1986); Nadine Taub & Wendy W.
Williams, Will Equality Require More thanAssimilation,Accommodation or Separation
from the Existing Social Structure?,37 RUTGERS L. REV. 825,829-32 (1985); Joan C. Williams,DeconstructingGender,87 MICH. L. REV. 797,836-40 (1989); Iris M. Young, Difference and Policy: Some Reflections in the Context of New Social Movements, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 535,540-50 (1987). Similarly, it represents an important theme in critical race
theory. See, e., PATRICIA J. WLIAmS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RiGms 9-10 (1991);, James
S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative AfroAmerican Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487,490-508
(1988); Ankur J. Goel et al., BlackNeighborhoodsBecoming Black Cities: GroupEmpowerment, Local Controland the ImplicationsofBeing DarkerThan Brown, 23 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 415, 416-18 (1988).
See David N. Myers, Dual Loyalty in a Post-ZionistEra,38 JUDAISM 333, 334
6.
(1989) (discussing this tension in the context of an analysis of the "national" status of
contemporary Jews and presenting the historical denouement of the kehilah).
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more accurately, reside in-a large structural change in the
political order of Europe: the shift from medieval corporatism
to the model of centralized nation-states, during which selfregulating subgroups (such as nobles, clerics, and guilds) began
to be perceived as threatening to social and political stability.7
This significant change provoked in turn a tumultuous process
of redefining Jewish communal identity-and created a stark
and revealing juxtaposition between the autonomy and holism
of the kehilah and the condition of alienation and displacement
that characterizes "modernity" in Jewish historical experience.
In tracing this transformation and ultimately applying its
lessons to contemporary American legal issues, we should be wary
of the dangers of idealization. A wistful turn to the organic
kehilah, which existed as a corporate entity within a corporatist
sociopolitical order, leads all too hastily to the conclusion that
the community was itself a paragon of democracy and tolerance.'
In reality, the degree of tolerance within a given community
depended on the composition of its members, the composition and
strength of its leadership, and its relations with the surrounding
environment. Wide disparities in size and management existed
among the kehilot, defying generalizations about their essential
character. Common to all, however, was the central role of
Jewish law (Halakhah) as legal, religious, and social arbiter.9

7.
See RR PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 305-406 (5th ed.
1978). For a discussion of the general change in theories of law and governance in medieval
Europe, see FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 176-80 (S.B. Chrimes
trans., 1939). Important contributions to Jewish communal history include 1 SALO W.
BARON, THE JEWISH COMMUNITY (1942), JACOB KATZ, TRADITION AND CRISIS: JEWISH SOCIETY
AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1961), Salo W. Baron, Ghetto andEmancipaon,14 MENORAH
J. 515 (1928); Shmuel Ettinger, The ModernPeriod,in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE
727 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976).
8.
For instance, Yitzhak Baer, in discussing the origins of the kehilah, suggests
that a popular, even democratic, spirit found among Jews in the Second Temple period
stimulated its birth. See Yitzhak Baer, Ha-hathalotve-ha-yesodot shel irgun ha-Kehilot
ha-yehudiyot bi-yeme ha-beynayim [The Origins of Jewish Communal Organizationin
the Middle Ages], 15 ZION 1 (1950), translatedin BINAH: STUDIES IN JEWISH HISTORY,
THOUGHT, AND CULTURE 59, 60 (Joseph Dan ed., 1989). According to Baer, the anti-rational,
democratic tendencies of the early ehilah form found fulfillment in the insular medieval
communities of Ashkenaz. His idealization of the democratic impulses of Ashkenazic
kehilot stands in stark contrast to his depiction of Spanish Jewish communal life, beset
by class strains and powerful assimilatory impul-ses. For a response to Baer's position
on the Spanish Jewish community, see Shalom Albeck, Yesodot mishtarha-kehilot biSefarad 'ad ha-Rama (1180-1244), 25 ZION 85 (1960).
9.
See Menachem Elon, Power and Authority: HalachicStance of the Traditional
Community and Its ContemporaryImplications,in KINSHIP AND CONSENT: THE JEWISH
POLITICAL TRADITION AND ITS CONTEMPORARY USES 183,185 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1981).
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Also common to the varied communities was the erosion of the
cohesive force of Halakhah with the onset of the modern era.
Throughout the Middle Ages, Jewish legal and legislative
autonomy not only existed but also was encouraged by the
corporate nature of feudal society. 10 There were no centralized
nation-states with individual subjects. Instead, there was a
complex division of authority, obligations, and rights divided
among discrete bodies or classes. Under this arrangement, local,
regional, and imperial rulers -as well as representatives of the
Church-granted "charters" or "privilegia" which dealt with
Jewish subjects collectively." When a particular sovereign
tolerated Jews-often because of the economic benefit he expected
them to bringl 2-he accorded physical protection and the right
to safety and security to the whole community; 13 conversely, when
a sovereign expelled Jews from a certain region, 4 the entire
community was affected.
The phenomenon of Jews existing as a distinct collective entity
within an alien religious and linguistic culture was the condition
of the exile par excellence before modern times. Since the loss
of national-territorial sovereignty in Eretz Yisrael (the land of
Israel), Jews more or less had accepted the political rule of the
10.
H.H. Ben-Sasson, The MiddleAges, in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE,supra
note 7, at 383, 501 [hereinafter Ben-Sasson, The Middle Ages]. While the inception of
the kehilah has been traced to the Second Temple period, the crystallization of the
medieval kehilah form has been identified around the time of Rabbenu Gershom (11th
century). See LOUIS FINKEI~sEIN, JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT INTHE MIDDLE AGES 5-7,21,
83 (1924); see also Baer, supra note 8, at 28. We should note that the Jews, as a function
of their changing economic role, were increasingly found in urban, not rural, environments
by this time. Ben-Sasson, The Middle Ages, supra,at 388. For a discussion of parallels
between the kehilah form and the medieval city, see H.H. Ben-Sasson, Mekoma shel hakehilah/ha-'irbe-toldot Yisra'el,reprintedin HA-KEFHAHA-YEHUDITBI-YEME HA-BEYNAYIM
7 (H.H. Ben-Sasson ed., 1976).
11.
For a collection of medieval privilegia and charters concerning Jews, see CHURCH,
STATE, AND JEW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 55-93 (Robert Chazan ed., 1980) [hereinafter CHURCH,
STATE, AND JEW].

12.
Id. at 9. Exemplary of the enthusiasm which inspired a local ruler to invite
Jews to reside in his area was the 11th-century charter of Ridiger, bishop of the German
village of Speyer, who "thought that the glory of our town would be augmented a
thousandfold if I were to bring Jews." Id. at 58. Another fascinating example of the
attempt by a ruler to induce Jews to inhabit his region is that of the Polish Duke Boleslav
from 1264. Id. at 88. Duke Boleslav's Charter was intended to ensure the responsible
protection of the Jews of Greater Poland; for example, the 35th clause of his charter
ordered that Christians who did not respond to the cries of Jews, "compelled by dire
necessity," heard in the night, might be liable to pay a considerable fine. Id. at 93.
13.
Id. at 10, 11.
14.
The most comprehensive expulsions of Jews in the Middle Ages were from
England (1290), France (1306), and the Iberian Peninsula (1492). Ben-Sasson, The Middle
Ages, supra note 10, at 463, 465, 570.
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host nations in whose midst they resided.1 5 Concomitantly, they
developed the kehilah form, which permitted the preservation
of Jewish faith and law in alien environs. Accompanying this
development was the articulation of a political theory, known
by the Aramaic Dina di-MalkhutaDina ("the law of the kingdom
is the law"), which rationalized and demarcated the extent of a
king's or ruler's sovereignty over the Jewish community. 16 This
elastic theory, when invoked, enumerated certain functions (such
as taxation) recognized as belonging to the host sovereign. 7 By
consequence, religious and ritual functions, and the authority
to enforce adherence to its norms, accrued to the kehilah.8 This
political theory of relations with the host society and, more significantly, the kehilah form itself were cultivated as mechanisms
of communal self-preservation in response to the exigencies of
exile. 9
The kehilah served the intracommunal needs of Jews through
institutions which instilled respect for Jewish ritual and law.2 °
Courts of law and educational institutions were vital cogs in the
medieval communal apparatus.2 ' Within that apparatus (excepting
those matters ceded to the authority of the host sovereign), Jewish
law reigned supreme-without distinguishing between the public
life of the community and the private lives of its members.2
Violations of its clauses and of related social norms 23 were met

15.
See KATZ, supra note 7, at 15-16 (stating that Jews did not question the right
of the host nation to expel them).
16.
See GIL GRAFF, SEPARAT1CN OF 0CHU
AND STA1m DNA D-MAuHUrA DINA IN JEwsH
LAW 1750-1848, at 8-29 (1985); Shmuel Shilo, Dina de-Malkhuta Dina, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA 51, 51-55 (1971). See generally SHMUEL SHIL, DINA DE-MALKHUTA DINA (1974).
17.
Shilo, supra note 16, at 53-55.
18.
SHILO, supranote 16, at 53. A particularly salient form of insuring adherence
to communal standards was the herem, or excommunication. See GRAFF, supra note 16,
at 17, 19.
19.
SHILO, supra note 16, at 51.
20.
KATZ, supra note 7, at 79.
21.
See ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, JEWISH LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 49-52,341 (Atheneum
1969) (1896); KATZ, supra note 7, at 94-95, 192.
22.
See KATZ, supra note 7, at 80.
23.
Halakhah is a dynamic legal system which spawns legal interpretations and
reformulations in a variety of ways. See Benjamin DeVries & Louis Jacobs, Halakhah,
in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1156, 1156-66 (1971) (describing the elements and differing
interpretations of the Halakhah). Thus, in addition to the canonized Oral Torah and
the venerated Halakhic sources which achieved universal approval in the Jewish world,
individual communities or regions developed ordinances and regulations to ensure adherence
to communal religious norms. See ABRAHAMS, supra note 21, at 58-61.
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with punitive responses.' Hence, just as Halakhah served to
regulate the public and private norms of the community, so the
community-through its lay and rabbinic leadership-served to
insure adherence to Halakhah.
Apart from its delineation of local communal borders, the
kehilah also served as the repository of a unique extraterritorial
identity which linked Jews regardless of their native land or
language. While desirous of preserving economic well-being in
their own towns and cities, leaders of a given Jewish community
also were encouraged by rabbinic rulings to welcome visits and5
solicitations from Jewish individuals and communities in need.2
The assistance of one community to another was stimulated by
a sense of shared fate among Jews, as well as by the shared
expectation of ultimate redemption and deliverance from exile,
to be achieved through a return to Zion.26
The medieval kehilah thus operated on several different levels.
Intracommunally, the kehilah acted according to the norms of
the self-contained community. Intercommunally, the kehilah
operated in two distinct ways: first, in its relations with other
Jewish communities and, second, in its relations with the host
sovereign and society (as reflected in the doctrine of Dina deMalkhuta Dina). But while observing that the kehilah's activity
and authority extended to each of these three planes, we nonetheless must recall that the prevailing political order of medieval
corporate society validated (or, in the case of expulsions, voided)
the Jewish claim to legal and religious autonomy.
Consequently, when the medieval political order of Central
and Western Europe began to disintegrate in the seventeenth

24.
One of the most powerful modes of punishment exercised by concerned authorities
was the herem, or writ of excommunication. See Ben-Sasson, The Middle Ages, supra
note 10, at 428. The success of the community in enforcing the laws obviously depended
on its own power of enforcement. The case of Jewish informers in medieval Spanish
Jewish communities presents a fascinating example of the limits of that power. Despite
the fact that the informers may well have informed on the Jewish community to the non-Jewish
host authorities,Jewish communal authorities, lacking the actual power to impose capital
punishment, "relaxed" (handed over) the informers to the Gentile authorities in order
to carry out their punishment. See id. at 498.
25.

Id. at 506.

26.
With few exceptions, this remained a largely passive expectation; accordingly,
human attempts to "hasten the end" were considered profane intrusions into a sacred
realm. However, medieval Jewish history knows of more than a few examples of messianic
activism in which the initiative to bring the Messiah was humanly inspired. See ABBA
HIIILEL SILVOR, A H19TORY OF MSIANIC SPXUAnON iN ISRAE FROM THE FioSr THmOUGH THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 55-56, 87-88, 143-50 (Peter Smith 1978) (1927).
27.
Ben-Sasson, The Middle Ages, supra note 10, at 409, 412-13.
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and eighteenth centuries 28as "enlightened despots" consolidated
disparate groups and territories into nation-states, 29 the
structural support for Jewish communal identity seemingly
Corporate bodies organized on the basis of
disappeared.
common religious, economic, or social interests now were
perceived as threatening to the state.3" The new breed of rulers
encouraged a kind of allegiance-an individual bond with the
state-which required the dissolution of communal affiliations.3 1
At the same time, this allegiance also required the conferral of
rights and obligations to the private subject. In the new
economy of political organization, the state bestowed upon Jews
the same rights and privileges accorded to others as individuals-provided that they yield their communal autonomy. This,
at least, was the hope of liberal thinkers such as John Locke
and John Toland, who pushed for the application of principles
of toleration to Jews on both altruistic and utilitarian
grounds.32

Although logic (and liberal theory) dictated it, Jewish equality
was not quick or uniform in coming. France was the first country
in which Jews (Sefardim in 1790 and the rest in 1791) were
granted citizenship rights.3 3 The sentiment among advocates
of Jewish emancipation was pointedly summed up in the words
of Count Clermont-Tonnerre, a delegate to the French National

28.
See Ettinger, supra note 7, at 727; see also Selma Stern-Taeubler, The Jew in
the Transitionfrom Ghetto to Emancipation,in 2 HISTORIA JUDAICA 102, 102-04 (1940)
(discussing the effects of absolutism, mercantilism, and rationalism on Jews).
29.
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, 14-15 (new ed. 1979)
(1951); KATz, supra note 7, at 247; see also HAJO HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY
1648-1840, at 63-67 (1964) (describing the development of the agencies of absolute
government in Germany).
30.
See Ettinger, supra note 7, at 750.
See KATZ, supra note 7, at 247-50.
31.
32.
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETER CONCERNING TOLERATION 45-52 (Patrick Romanell ed.
& William Popple trans., 1955) (1689) (arguing that because a man's first duty is to his
conscience, the state should exercise toleration unless a sect "challenge[s] any manner
of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion') JOHN TLAND, REASONS FOR NATURALIZING THE JEWS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND
(1714) (calling for the naturalization of British Jews both as a matter of principle and
as a matter of economic utility). As background to this development, Shmuel Ettinger
points to the Protestant Reformation as laying the foundation for a spirit of toleration,
and, consequently, a more beneficent attitude toward the Jews. S. Ettinger, The
Beginnings of the Change in the Attitude of European Society Towards the Jews, in 7
SCRIprA HIEROSOLYMITANA 193,195-96 (Alexander Fuks & Israel Halpern eds., 1961).
The challenge to Church authority and the new Hebraism, fostered by a desire to
return to the Old Testament, sola Scriptura,together stimulated this new sensibility.
33.
THE JEW INTHE MODERN WORLD 101-07 (Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz
eds., 1980).
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Assembly, who argued, "One must refuse everything to the Jews
34
as a nation but one must give them everything as individuals."
According to these terms, emancipation seemed to mandate an
end to Jewish communal autonomy.35
In Germany, where the intellectual and cultural values of the
Enlightenment (Aufkldirung) most deeply influenced Jews,
political emancipation proved far more elusive than in France.
Prussian Jews did receive civil rights in 1812,36 but new
restrictions on Jewish integration were enacted in the wake of
the conservative reaction which swept Europe following the defeat
of Napoleon.37 In fact, more than half a century passed before
Jews finally received equal status in the various German-speaking
territories.3 What so tellingly characterized the life of Jews in
these lands was the disparity between their intellectual and

ARTHUR HERTZBERG, THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE JEWS 360 (1968).
34.
PATRICK GIRARD, LES JUIFS DE FRANCE DE 1789 A 1860, at 173 (1976Y, see Elon, supra
35.
note 9, at 207. Interesting counter-texts to Clermont-Tonnerre's statement are found
in the famous essay of the ChristianAuftldarer,Christian von Dohm, Oberdie btirgerliche
Verbesserung der Juden, as well as in the responses of the Comte de Mirabeau and
Adolphe Thibry to the 1785 Royal Metz Academy essay contest on how to improve the
lot of the Jews. See CHRISTIAN KW. VON DOHM, ]OBER DIE BVRGERLICHE VERBFSSERUNG DER
JUDEN [CONCERNING THE AmEuORATION OF THE CIVIL STATUS OF THE JEWS] (1781), translated
inpartin FROM EXPULSION TO EMANCIPATION: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS ON JEWISH RIGHTS
16TH-18TH CENTURIES 141 (Yosef H. Yerushami ed.) [hereinafter FROM EXPULSION TO
EMANCIPATION] (collection of xeroxed primary sources for use in courses at Columbia
Universityy, HONORi GABRIEL RIQUEr, COME DE lRmA, SUR MOSES MENDELsOHN, SUR
LA REFORME POITIQUE DES JULES [ON MOSES MENDIELRSOHN, AND ON THE POlIIICAL REFORM OF

THE JEWS] (1787), translatedin partin FROM EXPULSION TO EMANCIPATION, supra,at 175;
QUESION: EST-IL DES MOYENS DE RENDRE LES JUNkS
ADOLPHE TH12RY, DISSERrATION SUR CIE
PUS HEUREUX E PLUS UTILES EN FRANCV. [A DISERrATION ON THE FILOWING QUESTON: ARE

THERE MEANS OF RENDERING THE JEWS HAPPIER AND MORE USEFUL IN FRANCE?] (1788),
translatedinpartin FROM EXPULSION TO EMANCIPATION, supra, at 176. All three seem
to have advocated some form of ongoing Jewish communal identity. Von Dohm and
Mirabeau approved of the continued use of excommunication on religious grounds. See
VON DORM, supra,at 161; MIRABEAU, supra,at 175. Thidry, too, urged that Jewish communities be left intact, at least for the short term. See THI]RY, supra,at 175-77. Their views
were adumbrated by the opinion of the renowned international legal scholar, Hugo Grotius,
on the status of the Jews in Holland. In his Remonstrantie, Grotius advocated legal
admission of the Jews to Holland. See HUGO GROTIUS, REMONSTRANTIE NOPENDE DE ORDRE

DuE IN DE LANDEN VAN HOLLANDT ENDE WESTvRIES LANDT DIJENT GESTELT op DE JODEN
[REMONSIRANCE, CONCENING THE REOrANIAON OF THE SITUATION OF THE JEWS INHOLLAND
AND WEST-FRISIA] (1615), translated in part in FROM EXPULSION TO EMANCIPATION, supra,
at 13. He also endorsed the rabbinic right of excommunication, provided there be a
parallel right of appeal to non-Jewish courts. Id. at 23.
Ettinger, supra note 7, at 788.
36.
Id. at 807. The rights granted under the 1812 Emancipation Law were not
37.
extended to areas of the state annexed after 1812; thus, the laws affecting treatment
of the Jews varied from place to place. Id.
See id. at 811-12. Emancipation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for example,
38.
came only in 1867, and in unified Germany, in 1869. Id. at 811.
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cultural achievements, on one hand, and their political and social
acceptance, on the other. For many, the alluring promise of
liberation held out by Aufkdrung and its Jewish cognate,
Haskalah, never was realized. Even when legal emancipation
was achieved, full social acceptance often did not follow, leading
to frustration and despair, particularly among those Jews with
the most to gain, the educated and the enlightened. The despair
of one such enlightened Jew, the poet Heinrich Heine, led him
to a path frequently followed by others-conversion-which he
referred to as his "entrance ticket to European culture."3 9
Each in its own way, the French and German cases of the lateeighteenth and nineteenth centuries reveal an insidious equation
in which the promise of full emancipation was offered in exchange
for the diminution or outright denial of Jewish identity. The
imperative to dissolve communal autonomy was communicated
to Western European Jews as a necessary price to pay for
liberation. This message was often internalized by Jews. Thus,
Moses Mendelssohn, regarded by some as the first truly "modern"
Jew, pleaded against the coercive force of religion in his famous
Jerusalem' - all the while remaining scrupulously observant of
Jewish ritual.41 To his mind, religion was a matter of moral suasion.4 2 Vestiges of coercion, such as excommunication, violated
the principles of "rational devotion" to which Mendelssohn
subscribed.'
An even balder example of internalization comes from a French
Jew of Revolutionary times, who called upon co-religionists "to
divest ourselves entirely of that narrow spirit, of Corporation and

Elizabeth Petuchowski, Introductionto HEINRICH HEINE, JEWISH STORIFS AND HE39.
BREW MELODIES 8 (1987). In cosmopolitan Berlin, capital of the German Enlightenment
and the Prussian state, full social acceptance came only with conversion and even then
was not guaranteed. See DEBORAH HER'I JEWISH HIGH SOCIETY IN OLD REGIME BERLIN 240,
249-50 (1988).
See Alexander Altmann, Introduction to MOSES MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM, OR ON
40.
RELIGIOUS POWER AND JUDAISM 3 (Allan Arkush trans., 1983) (1783) ("Jerusalemreaffirms
... [Mendelssohn's] strong conviction that neither religion nor the state is authorized
to coerce the consciences of men, and seeks to show ... that Judaism honors this
principle.").
41.
See 5 HENRCH GRAmvz, HISTORY OF THE JEWS 310 (1927) ("In the darkness of the
Ghetto he was a strictly orthodox Jew, who, apparently unconcerned about the laws of
beauty, joined in the observance of every pious custom.").
42.
See ALEXANDER ALTMANN, MOSES MENDELSSOHN: A BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY 551-52
(1973).
43.
Interestingly, Mendelssohn dissented from the view of the non-Jewish advocate
of Jewish toleration, Christian von Dohm, who supported continuation of Jewish juridical
autonomy. CompareMENDELSSOHN,supra note 40, at 73-75 with VON DOHM,supranote
35, at 161.
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Congregation, in all civil and political matters, not immediately
connected with our spiritual laws."" This message anticipated
the more systematic efforts of nineteenth-century German
religious reformers to redefine Jewishness as a voluntary
confession of faith. The German Reformers envisaged Judaism
as a Religionsgerneinschaft (a community defined in religious
terms alone), a vision that reflected their own acknowledgement
In the expectation of
of the contraction of Jewish identity.'
becoming full and active participants in society, they were
prepared to place severe limits on Jewish communal identity,
indeed, to surrender the reign of Halakhah and to profess primary
loyalty to the German nation.'
German-Jewish Reformers envisaged a Judaism shorn of its
juridical authority and consigned to the nonlegal private or
domestic sphere. The well-known refrain of the Jewish
Enlightenment movement memorialized this contraction; it
ordained that one "be a man in the street and a Jew at home." 47
The adage mirrored what Karl Marx somewhat approvingly
referred to as the "decomposition of man" into political and
religious realms. 4 A later and more sympathetic Jewish observer,
44.
Letter from M. Berr-Isaac-Berr to the Jews of France (1791), translatedinFROM
EXPULSION TO EMANCIPATION, supra note 35, at 249, 251.
45.
The radical religious reformer Samuel Holdheim stated at the first Reform
Rabbinical Conference atBrunswick, Germanyin 1844: "Whatwasonce acommandment
for the Israelite with regard to his fellow Israelite, must also oblige us with regard to
our contemporary compatriots-to the Germans. The doctrine of Judaism is thus, first
your compatriots [Vaterlandsgenossel then your co-religionists [Glaubensgenosse]."THE
JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 33, at 157.
46.
See supra note 45; see also W. GUNTHER PLAUT, THE RISE OF REFORM JUDAISM 133
(1963) ("Jews were eager to eschew all dual loyalties and to profess their respective
patriotism."), MICHAEL A. MEYER, RESPONSE TO MODERiTY: A HISIORY OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM 6 (1988) (stating that although the Reformers retained some aspects
of Halakhah,in other ways they departed from Jewish legal tradition); DAVID J. SORKIN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN JEWRY, 1780-1840, at 63-65 (1987) (discussing the effects
of the intervention of the absolutist states and the dissolution of communal autonomy
on Jews' views of political authority). Of particular interest regarding the effects of
emancipation and the dissolution of communal autonomy on Jewish law is the inverted
meaning to which the precept ofDina di-MalkhutaDina was applied in the case of the
Sanhedrin. The doctrine now came to justify government regulation of matters
traditionally left to Jewish law. See GRAFF, supra note 16, at 149-50 n.71.
47.
This refrain can be found in Awake, My People, a poem by the famous RussianJewish writer Y.L. Gordon. For the text of the poem and a novel interpretation of Gordon's
meaning, see MICHAEL STANISLAWSKI, FOR WHOM DO I TOIL?: JUDAH LEIB GORDON AND THE
CRISIS OF RUSSIAN JEWRY 49-52 (1988).
48.
Marx wrote: "The decomposition of man into Jew and citizen, Protestant and
citizen, religious man and citizen, is not a deception practised againstthe political system
nor yet an evasion ofpolitical emancipation. It ispoliticalemancipationitself,thepolitical
mode of emancipation from religion." Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question,in THE MARXENGELS READER 24, 33-34 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).
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Gershom Scholem, spoke despondently of the same phenomenon,
which he described as "the progressive atomization of the Jews
as a community in a state of dissolution, from which in the best
case only the individuals could be received."4 9
The bifurcation of private-religious and public-political
identities, observed by such diverse figures as Marx and Scholem,
set the stage for the central drama of the modern Jewish
experience in the West: the struggle to preserve a modicum of
Jewish identity while absorbing modern cultural and intellectual
values.5" This struggle took shape in the aftermath of the demise
of the medieval kehilah and of the holistic Jewish world view
and legal order which enveloped it. In the fractured world that
emerged, the age-old redemptive impulse to return to Zion was
checked, and lingering feelings of Jewish national unity were
significantly diluted. By the end of the nineteenth century, this
development had triggered a number of repercussive Jewish
responses, ranging from complete disaffection with Judaism to
a resurgent sense of Jewish national identity. Perhaps the most
important of these responses was Zionism, a movement explicitly
dedicated to rejoining the private and public components of
Jewish identity into an organic whole in Zion. 5 '
One intriguing, albeit short-lived, attempt to repair the breach
between private-religious and public-political identities was made
not in Palestine, but rather in America. There, in the first decade
of the twentieth century, a group of Jewish leaders in New York
City sought to revive the communal impulses of their fellow Jews
by establishing a city-wide organization known as the Kehillah."2
The outlandish claim of the New York City police commissioner
that fifty percent ofthe criminals in the city were Jewish inspired
their endeavors.5 3 Although the statement was retracted, Rabbi

GERSHOM SCHOLEM, Against the Myth of the German-JewishDialogue, in ON JEWS
49.
AND JUDAISM IN CRISIS 61, 62 (Werner J. Dannhauser ed., 1976). For a view which challenges the dichotomy between traditional and modern societies, see Robert Liberles,
Emancipationand the Structure of the Jewish Community in the Nineteenth Century,
in LEO BAECK INSTITUTE YEARBOOK 1986, at 51, 66-67 (Arnold Paucker ed., 1986).
David Sorkin offers an important new perspective by arguing that assimilation
50.
was not the only logical result of the struggle for Jewish emancipation in Germany. He
skillfully traces the emergence of a distinct Jewish "subculture" adjacent to, but not
subsumed within, the broader German society. See SORKIN, supra note 46, at 4-5.
51.
See Myers, supranote 6, at 337-39. We refer here explicitly to Western Zionism,
that version first formulated by the assimilated Viennese journalist Theodor Herzl in
the wake of the Dreyfus Affair. See MICHAEL A. MEYER, JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE MODERN
WORLD 62-63 (1990).
52.
ARIHuRA GOREN, NEW YORK JEWS AND THE QUEsT FOR COMMUNITY: TiEKEuH
EXPERIMENT 1908-1922, at 43-56 (1970).
Id. at 25-30.
53.
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Judah L. Magnes, one of the moving forces behind the Kehillah,
declared, "The one million of Jews of New York ... should draw
proper deductions from this incident. They need a permanent
and representative organization that may speak in their behalf,
that may defend their rights and liberties, and that may also cope
with the problems of criminality.. .. "'
This commitment to a permanent representative of Jewish
rights undergirded the founding convention of the Kehillah. On
February 27, 1909, the "Jewish Community of New York" was
formally established with the mandate "to further the cause of
Judaism ... and to represent the Jews of this city."' As it
developed organizationally over the course of its brief existence,
the Kehillah was governed by two sources of authority: the
Convention, open to delegates from all areas ofNew York Jewish
society, excepting political organizations;' and the various
administrative bureaus, staffed by professional employees. 57
With this new organization, Magnes and other Kehillah
advocates sought to preserve, or, more accurately, to recapture,
the integrity of Jewish communal life once embodied in the
medieval kehilah, all the while remaining within the bounds of
the American political tradition. In the wake of the founding
convention of 1909, Magnes articulated a vision of how that
tradition could accommodate such expressions of group identity
as the Kehillah:
The symphony of America ... must be written by the
various nationalities which keep their individual and
characteristic note, and which sound this note in harmony
with their sister nationalities. Then it will be a symphony
of color, of picturesqueness, of character, of distinction- not
the harmony of the Melting Pot, but rather the harmony
of sturdiness and loyalty and joyous struggle.5 8

54.
Wrong About Jews, Bingham Admits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1908, at 16.
55.
GOREN, supra note 52, at 51 (quoting Minutes of the Constituent Convention
of the Jewish Community of New York City (February 27-28, 1909) (on file in the Judah
L. Magnes Archives (Jerusalem), F48-L135)).
56.
J.L. Magnes, What the Kehiliah Has Given New York Jewry, Statement Presented
to the Eighth Annual Convention of the Kehillah of New York City 9 (Apr. 28-29, 1917).
57.
See id.at 10-15. In his Statement to the Eighth Convention, Magnes recommended
that the work of the Bureaus (Education, Industry, Social Morals, Religious Affairs, Philanthropic Research, and the School for Jewish Communal Work) be separated from that
of the popular Convention so as to improve the provision of services to New York's Jews.
Id. at 15.
58.
GOREN, supranote 52, at 4 (quoting 3 JUDAH L. MAGNES, THE EMANU-EL PULPIT
10 (1909)).
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To his chagrin, this vision of a harmonious symphony of
nationalities never was realized. The Kehillah experiment lost
momentum over the course of a decade and a half, ground down
by the divergent expectations, interests, and politics of New York
Jewry. 9 Over time, it became clear to Magnes that his erstwhile
faith in the malleability of American pluralism perhaps was
exaggerated. At one point, he recognized the tendency of
democracy "to level all distinctions, to create the average type,
almost to demand uniformity." ° In the last years of the
experiment, Magnes also recognized the ineradicable difference
between the kehilot of the Old World and the Kehillah of the New,
between the medieval and modern incarnations of Jewish
communal identity:
The European notion of a uniform,

...

all-controlling...

kehillah cannot strike root in American soil.., because it
is not in consonance with the free and voluntary character
of American religious, social, educational, and philanthropic
enterprises ....

The only power that the kebillah can exercise

is moral and spiritual in its nature, the power of an
enlightened public opinion, the power of a developed
community sense. 1
II. GROUPS IN THEORY
Though its life was brief and its impact on American Jewry
minimal, the experiment of the New York Kehillah is worth
recounting because it exposes the latent, and paradoxical, limits
of the principles of pluralism and tolerance embodied in
constitutional law. In imagining the revival of an organic Jewish
community, Judah Magnes seized upon the nostalgic imagery
of American ethnic interest groups -"color[ful]"
and
"picturesqu[e]" 62-even while he rejected the assimilationist
metaphor of "the Melting Pot." In observing the Kehillah's
ultimate failure to "strike root," Magnes acknowledged the levelling

59.
See id. at 247-52.
60.
2 JUDAH L. MAGNES, THE EMANU-EL PULPIT 7 (1909).
61.
GOREN, supranote 52, at 252 (quoting Minutes of the Special Convention of the
Kehillah (Jan. 13,1918) (on file in the Judah L. Magnes Archives (Jerusalem), F18-L24)).
62.
See supra text accompanying note 58.
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force of voluntarism and interest-group pluralism in American
society.63 But his epitaph on the New York Kehillah was more

ambivalent than bitter. While recognizing the failure to establish
a "uniform,... all-controlling" community, Magnes also indicated
an affirmation, reluctant though it was, of a voluntary (and
inevitably diminished) Jewish identity, not unlike that represented
by the German Religionsgemeinschaft.' What the failed efforts
of Magnes and his colleagues revealed was precisely that the
voluntariness of group membership in the modern liberal order
had eviscerated the foundation of Jewish communal life.'
Of course, many have perceived the limits of liberal pluralism,
even without the benefit of the lessons of Jewish history.' Legal

63.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
64.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
65.
The demise of the Kehillah did not, however, signal the end of Magnes's career
or aspirations for a renaissance of Jewish communal life. He emigrated to Palestine,
where he became one of the founders and the first chancellor of the Hebrew University
in Jerusalem. NORMAN BENTWIcH, JUDAH L.MAGNE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FwR CHANCELLOR
AND FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM 147-72 (1955).
66.
See, e.g., Cover, supra note 4, at 7-9 (contrasting the normative order of
particularistic subgroups and their requirements of the state with a universalist legal
order); Garet, supra note 4, at 1002-04, 1006-29 (demonstrating the failure of a system
based exclusively on individual rights and state interests to comprehend the unique claims
of groups); Martha Minow, Foreword, JusticeEngendered, 101 HARV. L.REV. 10, 12, 17-22
(1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered] (demonstrating how the recognition of
group differences can have the effect of their deprecation, while ignoring them and treating
all individuals the same likewise can have the effect of compounding group disadvantage);
Martha Minow, Putting Up andPuttingDown: Tolerance Reconsidered,in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 77,77-79 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990)
(observing the paradox involved in tolerating intolerance); Resnik, supra note 1, at 727-34,
747-49 (describing how apparent tribal sovereignty granted to Indians under plenary
law in fact involves domination and assimilation); Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and
State: An Essay on ConstitutionalismandReligious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741,746-66
(1987-88) [hereinafter Weisbrod, Family, Church and State] (describing the conflicts
in a pluralist society between the legal orders of religious subgroups and that of the state,
and various strategies undertaken by subgroups for overcoming or avoiding such conflicts).
Although these authors arrive at their critical insights independently of a close
examination of Jewish history, that does not mean that the Jewish case always has been
far from their minds. Cover's article, in particular, is steeped in Jewish sources. See
Cover, supra note 4, at 11-23; see also Ronald R. Garet, Dancing to Music: An Interpretation
of Mutuality, 80 KY. L.J. 893, 894-900 (1992) (discussing a Jewish senior center); id.
at 937-38 (analyzing the Israeli declaration of independence); Minow, Justice Engendered,
supra, at 19, 32 (1987) (discussing Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615
(1987), in which a Jewish congregation argued that federal law proscribing interference
with property on racial grounds should be applied as a prohibition against the desecration
of a synagogue; and asserting a difference between unstated white Christian norms implicit
in law and the norms of minority groups, including Jews); Carol Weisbrod, DivorceStories:
Readings, Comments and Questions on Law and Narrative, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 143,
191 (contrasting the Jewish law of marriage and divorce to state law in order to demonstrate
how some "sub-groups ...think about divorce in their own way"); Weisbrod, Family,
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scholars have become increasingly sensitive to the burdens that
fall on certain religious groups as a result of the state's
commitment to the values of tolerance and neutrality among
But the concrete
different religious and nonreligious views.
details of the evolution of Jewish communal life under a liberal
political order provide a foil to existing legal scholarship,
alternately reinforcing its insights and challenging the adequacy
of its conceptual apparatus.
The recognition of the burdens and costs of liberal toleration
has stimulated numerous efforts to devise an alternative to the
liberal conception of religion as a voluntary, essentially private
association68-an association which, by virtue of its private

Churchand State, supra,at 744 n.6 (referring to the Ottoman Empire's "millet" system,
under which non-Muslim minorities, includingJews, were accorded a measure ofseparate
judicial authority); Carol Weisbrod, PracticalPolyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist
Jurisprudence,24 GA. L. REV. 985,988 (1990) (stating that Jewish jurisprudence is different
from feminist jurisprudence because it is concerned with the legal theory of a particular
group); see also Frank T. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 5-17 (1985) (focusing on the general question of the relationship between
culturally diverse subgroups and the state and on the particular case of Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), in which an orthodox Jewish member of the Air Force
sought and was denied the right to wear a yarmulke while on duty); Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 270 n.14
(1991) (observing a similarity between university regulations against racist speech and
behavior and "efforts of the Inquisition in sixteenth-century Spain to discover and punish
all external signs of inward backsliding on the part ofMoors and Jews who had outwardly
converted to Catholicism in order to avoid expulsion"); Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues,
87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1427 n.20 (1989) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
A CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1988)) (noting cases which "involve the role
of a Jewish minority in a predominantly Christian country"). These passing references
evince the authors' interest in the case of the Jewish community's relationship to a larger
pluralist society, but do not constitute a sustained discussion of that subject.
67.
See, e.g., Garet, supra note 4, at 1030-35; Michelman, supra note 66, at 4-17;
Tushnet, supranote 4, at 703-06; David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism
and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 769,889-96 (1991). Needless to say, the paradox
of tolerance-the intolerant effect of the pursuit of tolerance-was apparent to those
who were affected by it long before it was discovered and named by students of the
phenomenon.
68.
The locus classicus for the liberal conception of religion would be John Locke's
A Letter Concerning Toleration. Locke wrote:
I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any church;
otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by the same right
of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone would hold his faith by the
same tenure he does his lands, than which nothing can be imagined more absurd.
Thus, therefore, that matter stands. No man by nature is bound unto any particular
church or sect, but everyone joins himself voluntary to that society in which he
believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God.
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character, overlaps minimally with civic obligations. These various
theoretical efforts draw from and contribute to more general
scholarly efforts to expose and to critique problematic aspects
of such central liberal tenets as the exclusive sovereignty of the
state and state law,69 and the neutrality of official law.7 °
The scholarship that contributes to the reconsideration of
liberalism can be sorted in a variety of different ways. The scheme
of classification we adopt here delineates three schools of thought:
(1) civic republicanism, (2) legal pluralism, and (3) cultural
pluralism. Civic republicanism refers broadly to an ancient and
variegated tradition of political thought, centered on the ideals
of active citizenship or civic virtue, of a politics dedicated to the
common good, and on the notion of practical reason and collective
debate serving as agents for the realignment of private will with
the general good. 71 The civic republicans we have in mind are
contemporary American legal scholars-in the main, constitutional
scholars-who propound an interpretation of American law based

LOCKE, supra note 32, at 20. For a typical contemporary scholarly expression of the Lockeanliberal conception of religion as a voluntary and private affair, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 105-21 (1986) (embracing a Lockean vision of freedom
of religious conscience). For case law, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(rejecting an Amish claim for exemption from social security taxes where the law did
not burden the choice of individuals to follow a particular religion); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding a religious conscientious objector law); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 app. II at 719 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[W]e hold
it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion or the duty which we owe to
our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence.' "(quoting Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 64(1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madison, Memorial andRemonstranceAgainst
Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183,184 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1901) (1785) (quoting THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI (1776))))).

The liberal conception of religion as private and voluntary was absorbed into some
strands of Jewish philosophical thought, beginning with Moses Mendelssohn's Jerusalem.
See MENDELSSOHN, supra note 40, at 45, 73.
69.
See infra text accompanying notes 84-95.
70. The critique of legal neutrality is a leitmotif of critical legal scholarship. See
generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV.

L. REv. 1685, 1731-37 (1976); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497,1508-13 (1983); Mark V. Tushnet, Followingthe Rules LaidDown" A Critique
ofInterpretivism and NeutralPrinciples,96 HARV. L. REV. 781,804-24 (1983); Roberto
M. Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561,655-60 (1983).
71.
See J.GA POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMEMP. FLORENINE POIMCAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 49-50 (1975) (discussing "a theory of knowledge

which allows great latitude for public decisions upon public events"); id. at 56-57 (describing
the ideal of active citizenship); id. at 74-76 (describing the notion of the common good);
see also J.GA POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 39-43 (1985) (summarizing the

elements of classical republicanism). For an insightful overview of the historiography
of civic republicanism, see JOYCE APPLEBY, LIERAuSM AND REKmUCANSM IN THE HmirICAL
IMAGINATION (1992).
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on civic republican principles.7 2 Legal pluralism, informed by
the disciplines of sociology and cultural anthropology, is a
contemporary school of thought that challenges the reduction
of all law to official state law, and asserts the multiplicity of legal
systems. Cultural pluralism refers to scholarship marked by the
effort to attend to cultural diversity and to avoid unnecessary
impositions on cultural sub-groups.
This classification scheme is designed to accomplish two ends.
First, it brings one body of thought, which has been
marginalized-legal pluralism 3-into contact with the other two
modes, which have gained wide attention in the conventional
organs of legal academic scholarship74 and which grapple with
the same central question that animates legal pluralism, namely,
the relationship between cultural sub-groups and the state.7 5
The second feature of the classification scheme adopted here
is that it highlights tensions within pluralist thought. Like any
classification scheme, this one is to a certain extent artificial.
Particular works or writers do not fall neatly under one label
precisely because they tend to straddle the conceptual tensions
that divide one school of thought from another. The classification
offered here is based on the divergent responses to the inherent
tensions of pluralism, tensions which are made palpable by the
example of the Jewish kehilah. By advancing this scheme, we
hope to clarify these tensions, paving the way for further
systematic analysis.
Examination of the kehilah reveals some of the features of
associational life that the conventional conception of extra state

72.
See, e.g., Frank Michelman,Law's Republic,97 YALE L.J. 1493,1494(1988); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the RepublicanRevival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540-41 (1988).
73.
The principal venue for legal pluralism, the Journal of Legal Pluralismand
Unofficial Law, was published for its first 18 issues under the name African Law Studies.
Its editorial advisory board is international and draws heavily on anthropologists,
sociologists, ethnographers, comparative law specialists, and economists. Manuscripts
are collected in the Netherlands.
74.
Yale Law Journal devoted an entire issue to a symposium on civic republicanism.
See Symposium, The Republican Civil Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). Frank
Michelman's discussion of republicanism, Traces of Self-Government, appeared as a Foreword
to the HarvardLaw Review's widely read Supreme Court issue. See Michelman, supra
note 66. HarvardLawReview has published other articles discussing civic republicanism.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Robert C. Post, The ConstitutionalConceptofPublicDiscourse:
Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 603 (1990); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989).
75.
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 72, at 1506, 1526-31 (proposing a notion of
republican citizenship not centered on the state, encompassing diversity and cultural
plurality); Post, supranote 4, at 299-305 (outlining the cultural pluralist commitment
to preserving the "diversity [that] inheres in the various perspectives of differing groups").
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Latter-day civic
associations commonly fails to capture.
republicans, cultural pluralists, and legal pluralists all reject the
model of religious and cultural subgroups as associations that
are reducible to the private will of the individual ' 6 But they also
share a lack of clarity about precisely what it is that is missing
from the conventional liberal account-and what they believe
is imperiled by the institutionalization of liberal principles. Is
it differing values? Beliefs? Traditions? Ways oflife? Or cultural
autonomy? Legal autonomy? Perhaps competing political
sovereignties?
If the history of the demise of the kehilah does not provide an
automatic answer to this set of questions, it does caution against
leaping to simple conclusions or failing to differentiate among
these claims. The kehilah historically combined religious, cultural,
legal, and nationalist impulses." In the course of its evolution,
the organic unity of these forces fractured in various ways.
Sometimes, as with Reform Judaism, religious beliefs were separated
from coercive legal authority.78 In this case, the political/national
face of Judaism was suppressed in favor of a new affiliation as
German or American citizens (of the Jewish faith). Although
certain religious practices were preserved in the private realm,
the holistic way of life of medieval Jewry, regulated by Halakhah,
was rejected. In the case of secular Zionism, by contrast, the
aspiration for political sovereignty became ascendant, while the
meaning of Jewish religious autonomy and the relationship of

Michelman has described Jewish identity as "[w]hat Robert Cover called a 'paideic'
76.
community. Such a community is formed by strong interpersonal bonding through shared
commitment to a specific moral tradition and its contemporary elucidation." See Michelman,
supra note 66, at 13 (citing Cover, supra note 4, at 12-13). Robert Cover made it clear
that discourse in the paideic community, which Michelman seeks to absorb into the republican tradition, is less analytic and critical than "initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and
performative." Cover, supra note 4, at 13. The understanding that these religious and
cultural affiliations are not chosen is displayed in Post's analysis of the legal view of
cultural pluralism and individualism. See Post, supranote 4, at 303-05. Similarly, the
anthropological conception of cultural groups, underlying legal pluralism, implies attachments that are the product of acculturation rather than individual, rational choice.
See supra notes 6-25, 50-59 and accompanying text.
77.
78.
The idea of a de-nationalized, noncoercive Judaism was most effectively propagated
among nineteenth-century German Jews by Abraham Geiger. A distinguished scholar
and rabbi, Geiger was devoted to the principle that one should be a German of the Jewish
fith See ABRAm GE[cG AND lzAL Jumm THE CHA1I/GE OF THE NDmNER41 C NIURY
63 (Max Weiner ed. & Ernst J. Schlochauer trans., 1962). This formulation was later
memorialized in the name of the important German-Jewish organization, Centralverein
deustscherStaatsbiirgerJiidischen Glaubens(Central Organization of German Citizens

of the Jewish Faith).
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Jewish state power to Jewish law were left unclear.7 9 In the case
of the New York Kehillah, Jews attempted-unsuccessfully-to
merge a greater measure of communal self-government with the
desire to participate in a liberal pluralist society.80
All of these examples suggest the difficulty of detaching Jewish
religion- and Jewish identity, more generally- from the domain
of Jewish legal and political authority. At the same time, they
indicate the difficulty of fusing an autonomous Jewish legal and
political culture with citizenship in a non-Jewish state. The
question then becomes, what remains as the object of preservation
when Jewishness is divested of legal and political authority?
Pluralists have sought to address a similar question when
contemplating the role-on a more basic level, the prospects for
survival-of a separate, autonomous, legal-political subcommunity within a state. Critics have taken pluralists to task
for expressing "a nostalgia for a quasi-medieval system of
autonomous jurisdictions."8 ' The same charge could be pinned
on the current revivalists of the civic republican tradition, insofar
as they too seek protection for separate "jurisgenerative,"82 or
lawmaking, communities.' This charge, and the general question
of the desired, or possible, relations among normative subgroups,
and between them and the state, have yet to be adequately
addressed.
The apprehension that certain liberal legal institutions are
biased in favor of the exclusive recognition of official state law
has induced many theoretical reevaluations of intermediate
associations and subgroups.'
This observation is the very
foundation of legal pluralism. Thus, legal pluralism has been

79.
Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, believed that organized religion
should have a carefully circumscribed and subsidiary role in a Jewish state. For Herzl,
it was the national character of Jews, not the religious character of Judaism, which undergirded
the Zionist movement for national revival. See THEODORE HER2, THE JEWISH STATE 15-17,
71 (H. Pordes ed. & Sylvie D'Avigdor trans., 6th ed. 1972) (1896).
80.
See supra notes 6-25, 50-59, 71 and accompanying text.
81. F.M. Barnard & R.A. Vernon, Pluralism,Participation,and Politics:Reflections
on the IntermediateGroup, 3 POL. THEORY 180,193 (1975);cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE
NECESSITY 41-124 (1987) (criticizing polyarchy).
82.
See Cover, supra note 4, at 11 (inventing the term "jurisgenesis," the creation
of legal meaning).
83.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713,1718 (1988)
(criticizing current republican revivalists' attempt to reconcile republicanism with group
heterogeneity on the ground that "[alffirming ongoing differences among involuntary
groups appears a fatal concession, undercutting the republican project of pursuing, even
aspirationally, a unitary common good").
84.
See Cover, supra note 4; Resnick, supra note 1.
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defined as the antithesis of "legal centralism,"' which itself is
described as an ideology that "law is and should be the law of
the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and
administered by a single set of state institutions."86
What legal pluralists refer to as legal centralism, then, is simply
the conventional view that the law of the polity is qualitatively
different from forms of normative ordering that are found in social
units outside the nation-state and exclusively warrants the
nomenclature of "law." According to the legal pluralists, this is
false as a matter of description.87 Instead, they contend that law,
properly understood, "is the self-regulation of a 'semi-autonomous
social field.' 8 Furthermore, semiautonomous social fields are
numerous and overlapping, and therefore law and legal institutions
are not "subsumable within one 'system.'" 9 The legal pluralist
definition of law is thus very broad-virtually as broad as the
anthropological conception of a social field, which includes "both
corporate groups and less formally bounded action-arenas. "9°
It embraces not only religious law, like Halakhah, but also the
self-regulation of such diverse organizations as trade associations,
professional associations, particular industries (such as the
garment industry with its own customs and rules), and even
shopping centers, which appear in this analysis as arenas of
autonomous law or "reglementation."9 ' Law, on this account,
abounds in diverse social organizations.9 2

85.
John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?,24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 4-5 (1986).
86.
Id. at 3; see also Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, PrivateOrdering,
and IndigenousLaw, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 17 (1981) (describing the perspective of
legal centralism as "a picture in which state agencies.., occupy the center of legal life
and stand in a relation of hierarchic control to other, lesser normative orderings such
as the family, the corporation, the business network" (citation omitted)).
87.
See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 85, at 3-4 ("[L]egal centralism has long been the
major obstacle to the development of a descriptive theory of law .... [Ilt has also been
the major hindrance to accurate observation.").
88.
Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted). Though the term "semiautonomous social fields"
is adopted from Sally Falk Moore, she herself maintains the distinction between the selfregulation of the state, for which she reserves the term "law," and that of al other social
fields, which she designates as "reglementary activity." See SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS
PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 8,18,57-58 (1978). She thus does not represent
the legal pluralist school of thought.
Griffiths, supra note 85, at 38-39.
89.
90.
FALK MOORE, supranote 88, at 29; see also Weisbrod, Family,Churchand State,
supra note 66, at 743 (observing the breadth of the legal pluralist conception of law).
91.
See FALK MOORE, supra note 88, at 18; see also Galanter, supra note 86, at 22
n.34 (referring to literature which describes self-regulation in these settings).
92.
Note how this claim about the abundance of law parallels the claim that politics,
rather than being a unique property of state government, is a feature of all or most "private"
intermediate associations. Such a claim is made by proponents of the direct participation
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Legal pluralists offer this much as a descriptive claim. Without
their conception of law, they insist, our understanding of how
official law works and what it does is hindered. 93 Not surprisingly,
a normative claim is also implicit in this conception of law. By
taking extra-state "law" seriously, legal pluralism reveals the
harms that result from the incursion of official state law into
autonomous legal realms-harms which would not be apparent
were we blinded to the existence of extra-official law.
This is not to say that legal pluralists unwaveringly favor the
protection of unofficial against official law.' It is not even clear
that that is a coherent proposition. Could anyone coherently
champion all unofficial law? Nonetheless, by positing the existence
ofextra-state normative orderings, the legal pluralist perspective
uncovers effects, namely, the disruption of such normative
orderings, which might support moral claims against the official
regimes which produce them.
These moral implications are strengthened when the descriptive
thesis (positing the existence of extra-state normative orderings)
is attached to the additional claim that extra-state orderings are
singularly responsible for constituting such human goods as
personal values, beliefs, and even the very sense of one's self.9"
For example, if we understand the kehilah as an autonomous

school of democratic theory, which has roots in the civic republican tradition. See, e.g.,
CAROLE PATEMAN, PAIwCIPATON AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-66 (1970) (propounding a theory
of political participation in the workplace as well as the polis). For criticism of this
participationist claim, linking participationist theory to the thought of Harold Laski and
G.D.H. Cole (the English "pluralist" theorists who may also be seen as forerunners of
today's legal pluralists), see Barnard & Vernon, supra note 81.
93. See, eg., Galanter, supra note 86, at 27 ("[A]ny major advance in our understanding
of how official legal regulation works in society depends on knowing more about indigenous
law and about its interaction with official law."); Griffiths, supra note 85, at 4 ("Legal
pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion.").
94. Marc Galanter explained:
I am not trying to turn legal centralism upside down and place indigenous law
in the position of primacy.... Nor do I mean to idealize indigenous law as either
more virtuous or more efficient than official law. Although by definition indigenous
law may have the virtues of being familiar, understandable and independent of
professionals, it is not always the expression of harmonious egalitarianism. It often
reflects narrow and parochial concerns; it is often based on relations of domination;
its coerciveness may be harsh and indiscriminate; protections that are available
in public forums may be absent.
Galanter, supra note 86, at 25.
95. This viewpoint is embraced by "communitarians." See, eg., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 258 (2d ed. 1984); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LamIS OF JUSICE

150 (1982); CHARLEs TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 84-95 (1979).
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political and juridical order-as the legal pluralists would-we
can see the effects of the liberal redefinition of relations between
the individual and the state: the diminution of Jewish identity,
the contraction of the sphere of Jewish law, and the alteration
of the traditional terms of communal existence. But unless we
have reason a priori to value "Jewish identity," defined in
accordance with Halakhah, we may not necessarily see, or be
moved by, the harm involved in the demise of the kehilah. Instead
of a harm, we merely may see a change.
One can take a further step and regard the demise of the kehilah
as a harm if one holds either of the two following viewpoints.
The traditional Jew, who is personally invested in perpetuating
(or resuscitating) the kehilah and Halakhah,naturally holds the
view that a harm results from their demise. But also endorsing
this view will be one who adopts the second viewpoint, which
holds that the social relations which followed the disintegration
of the corporatist order display some bad characteristics-for
example, alienation and anomie-in the absence of the small-scale
intermediate groups that (in this view) make life meaningful.
Only by adopting this kind of explicitly normative thesis-that
human goods, such as meaningfulness and a sense of self, arise
exclusively in legal fields outside the state-does the legal pluralist
view gain prescriptive punch. If not for that thesis, there would
be no particular reason to protect fields of law outside the state.
There would be no reason to assume that human needs (for
example, for meaningfulness or for a sense of self) were not
satisfied adequately by informal forms of association like the Religionsgemeinschaft, based exclusively on a confession of faith,
without political or juridical authority. Nor would there be any
reason to suppose that those needs could not be met by that special
(and specially reviled) form of association-the state.
Legal pluralists display some ambivalence about this prescriptive
assertion of the superior moral worth of the subcommunity, as
opposed to the state. Cultural pluralists, however, define
themselves by the centrality of this normative claim. 96 In this

96.
See, e.g., Galanter, supranote 86, at 25. This contrast between cultural pluralists
and legal pluralists carries the danger of overstatement. It may suggest that cultural
pluralists are identifiable individuals who clearly define their points of view in ways
that distinguish them from legal pluralists, by rejecting the notion of multiple legal cultures
that forms the basis of legal pluralism. In fact, however, we are not aware of any cultural
pluralists who expressly dispute the existence or the value of separate legal cultures.
Instead, exponents of cultural pluralism tend not to address the distinction between legal
cultures and other forms of cultural life or the relation of their viewpoints to legal pluralism.
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view, pluralism means that "the affirmative value of diversity
9 7 This position rests
is explicitly acknowledged and celebrated."
on two basic premises. One is the normative proposition that
"diversity is to be safeguarded." 98 The second is the descriptive
proposition that "diversity inheres in the various perspectives
of differing groups,"' rather than in the perspectives ofindividuals.
In one respect, the cultural pluralists' descriptive position
overlaps with that of the legal pluralists: the existence of
normative orderings in associations outside of the state is the
central assumption, and object of concern, of both schools of
thought. But while cultural pluralism is generally preoccupied
with differences in "values,"'" legal pluralism focuses exclusively
on those value systems that qualify as sovereign or "legal"
systems. 'o'
To the extent that legal pluralists adopt a broad definition of the
attributes of a legal system, their objects of protection coincide with
those of the cultural pluralists. But the cultural pluralist notion
of"'manyness, variety, differentiation,' as opposed to... the dead
uniformity ofAmericanization" °2 encompasses cultural phenomena
that are not part of an integrated legal system. In this respect,
cultural pluralism extends beyond legal pluralism, which is concerned
solely with forms of cultural life which contain the formal features
of a legal system, for example, legal codes, tribunals, and sanctions.
The example of state laws interfering with the dress code of
a subgroup illustrates the practical result of this difference. Legal

Nevertheless, our suggestion is that the cultural pluralists' faith in the possibility of
a unitary, official "pluralist law," embracing the cultural heterogeneity of the nation,
is implicitly a form of legal centralism. This viewpoint implies that the forms of cultural
life protected by cultural pluralism do not include alternative political or legal sovereignties.
See infra text accompanying notes 139-140. Because this conclusion is an implication,
rather than an actually expressed statement of a cultural pluralist, references to "cultural
pluralists" in this Article should be understood as references to a typology, rather than
to any particular authors, such as Robert Post, upon whom we rely to illustrate aspects
of the cultural pluralist point of view.
97.
Post, supra note 4, at 301 (emphasis added).
Id. at 302-03.
98.
Id. at 303.
99.
100. See, e.g., id. at 299 (concentrating on the "distinctive values" of cultural groups).
101. See Weisbrod, Family, Church and State, supra note 66, at 743. According to
Weisbrod, legal pluralism "asserts that it is arbitrary to confine the term 'sovereignty'
to aspects of the state and... argues that 'sovereignty' can be located in groups other
than the state." Id. Weisbrod observes further that this idea of legal pluralism "must
be distinguished from the idea of 'cultural pluralism,' which assumes the fact or desirability
of cultural or social diversity within a single sovereign state." Id.
102. Post, supranote 4, at 301 (quoting HORACE KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY 43
(1924)).
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pluralists would be concerned with the overriding of a dress code
if the code in question formed part of a corpus of regulations backed
by sanctions-for example, the Jewish practice of wearing a headcover. In fact, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of official (in this case, military) regulations prohibiting this practice
several years ago in Goldman v. Weinberger."°3 In Goldman, the
Court denied an army doctois claim that army regulations forbidding
the wearing of nonuniform items, including head-coverings, violated
his right to the free exercise of religion."°4 The narrow majority
opinion upholding the military regulations ignited the protest
of commentators who shared the pluralist commitment to protecting
the autonomy of cultural and legal subgroups, like the community
of orthodox Jews. °5 Legal pluralists presumably would not put
the same weight on the violation of the dress code of, say, a skinhead,
for whom the code expressed an anarchic, individual cultural lifestyle,
rather than compliance with a code of commands."° Cultural
pluralists, by contrast, could be expected to see in both the case
of the religious Jew and the skinhead a similar harm-not the
harm of the forced violation of a religious command, but the pressure
to abandon a peculiar custom.
This distinction between legal pluralism and cultural pluralism
turns on the distinction between culture and law. But, for several
reasons, that boundary turns out to be difficult to trace. Customs
tend to acquire the force of law; but at precisely what point is
an inherently controversial question. The Jewish head-covering,
or yarmulke, at stake in Goldman v. Weinberger is a good example.
Despite the widespread practice and sense of its obligatoriness
among Orthodox Jews, rabbis over the centuries have disagreed
about whether wearing a yarmulke is required. °7 Hence, simply
103. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
104. See id. at 509-10.
105. See, e.g., Michelman, supranote 66, at 17-55 (associating the protection of the
Jewish practice with the civic republican approach).
106. We are assuming, being &*irlyignorant of skinhead culture ourselves, that skinheadism
does not qualify as a legal system under the legal pluralist definition of law. If we are
mistaken in this assumption, substitute a hypothetical manifestation of difference in
dress that has emerged more or less spontaneously, as opposed to appearing in conformity
with some prescribed norms.
107. No explicit Biblical precept commands a male Jew to cover his head (although
it is now a common practice among Orthodox Jews). Meir Ydit, Head, Covering of the,
in 8 ENCYcLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1, 1 (1971). Moreover, the Talmud (Nedarim 30b) maintains
that the practice of covering one's head is optional-a view to which many medieval and
early modern rabbinic commentators lent support. However, in the past two centuries,
the practice of head-covering has become symptomatic and, in part, a causal agent of
the denominational divisions between the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jewish
movements. See id. at 5-6.
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as a matter of phenomenology, the distinction between custom
and law is difficult to discern. Other theoretical developments
further complicate the distinction. The legal pluralists' definition
of law relies on a cultural-anthropological perspective, which likens
law to culture. The cultural pluralists aim to translate cultural
differences into group rights, thus converting culture into law.
Both of these intellectual moves make it difficult to state the
difference between the "legal" systems of which legal pluralists
are solicitous, and the more general "cultural" values that motivate
cultural pluralists.
Perhaps the distinction lies in the concept of "political sovereignty."
Sovereignty classically has been defined as "that absolute and
perpetual power vested in a commonwealth" 10 8 over its citizens
and subjects. The crucial feature, for purposes of distinguishing
legal systems from cultural systems more generally, is the idea
of governance and the corollary notion of being subject to governance.
Governance is a necessary feature of the cultural system described
by legal pluralists as "law." In the legal pluralists' own terms,
legal rules make up a "body of authoritative learning,""° which
is applied to the subjects, usually by specialized authoritative
bodies (such as courts) through a variety of specialized "processing"
techniques (such as "administrative processing, record-keeping,
ceremonial changes of status, settlement negotiations, mediation,
arbitration, and 'warfare' (the threatening, overpowering and disabling
of opponents), as well as... adjudication""l0 ).
By contrast, governance, or sovereignty, is not a necessary
characteristic of the subgroups which cultural pluralists seek
to protect. This distinction is especially evident in the different
visions of the relationship between the state, and the relevant
subgroups endorsed by legal pluralism and cultural pluralism,
respectively. For legal pluralists, relationships between legal
subgroups and the state are inherently problematic precisely because
they involve multiple sovereignties with potentially or actually
incongruous systems of governance."' From this perspective,

108. JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 25 (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955). For
a discussion of the relationship between Bodin's conception of sovereignty and his views
about religious toleration, see Stephen Holmes, JeanBodin" The ParadoxofSovereignty
and the PrivatizationofReligion, in RELIGION, MORALITY,AND THE LAW: NOMOs XXX 5,
29-31 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988).
109. Galanter, supra note 86, at 1.
110. Id. at 3.
111 See id. at 17 (arguing against the "habitual perspective of 'legal centralism,'
a picture in which state agencies (and their learning) occupy the center of legal life and
stand in a relation of hierarchic control to other, lesser normative orderings" (citation

660

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 25:3 & 4

conflicts between the state and the subgroup represent conflicts
between official law and unofficial law, which are intractable unless
one sovereignty capitulates to the other.
By contrast, cultural pluralists aspire to a single, unified (implicitly
national) body of law that "attempts to create ground rules by
which diverse and potentially competitive groups can retain their
distinct identities and yet continue to coexist."" 2 The very idea
that coexistence is attainable suggests that cultural groups are
not seen as posing the same sort of threat to the state as a rival
sovereign. Conversely, under "ground rules" which include the
recognition of group rights, cultural pluralists imagine that the
activities of the state need not interfere unduly with the maintenance
of cultural identity. Reconciling differences in cultural "perspectives"
under the aegis of a unitary political and legal system somehow
seems easier than uniting different sovereignties. Thus, cultural
pluralists express less concern about the dissolution of alternative
structures of legal and political authority and more about the
subtle threats to group identity posed by assimilation and
individualism."'
The question of multiple versus unitary sovereignty, which
cultural pluralists do not address directly, is of paramount
concern to contemporary civic republicanism. In its most recent
incarnation in legal theory, "civic republicanism" has been
invoked to challenge the legal tenet of neutrality and to
redefine principles of equality in a fashion that renders
adjudication more permeable to claims by minority groups,
including religious groups."' By contrast, the focus of both

omitted)); Weisbrod, Family, Churchand State, supra note 66, at 745 ("The social world
is described rather as English pluralists or legal pluralists describe it, as filled with competing
sovereignties and sources of law."); see also Resnik, supranote 1, at 753-59 (suggesting
an alternative to the hierarchical ordering offederal and tribal courts based on the meaningfid
ascription of "sovereignty" to the latter as well as to the former).
112. Post, supra note 4, at 302.
113. See id.at299-305 (distinguishingpluralism from assimilationism andindividualism);
Resnik, supranote 1, at 727-29 (describing and criticizing assimilationist policies toward
Indian tribes); id. at 747-49 (acknowledging the assimilationist pressure resulting from
enforcing individual rights against a tribal definition of group membership).
114. See Michelman, supra note 66, at 15(" 'Neutral' legal standards seem to absolve
their promulgators-sometimes the very judges who apply them-of responsibility for
their contributions to socially unequal or conflictual outcomes."); Michelman, supranote
72, at 1532-37 (crafting a republican constitutional argument for striking down the
Georgia antisodomy law upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Sunstein,
supra note 72, at 1550 ("The requirement of deliberation is designed to insure that
political outcomes will be supported by reference to a consensus (or at least broad
agreement) among political equals." (emphasis added)); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 72-73 (1985) [hereinafter
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schools of pluralism-legal and cultural pluralism-has been on
identifying loci of collective self-government outside of the state.
Civic republicanism, even more strongly and unequivocally
than cultural pluralism, is committed to a unitary sovereignty:
the polity. 115 As currently invoked by legal theorists, civic
republicanism borrows from pluralist thought in two different
ways. First, like both legal and cultural pluralism, contemporary
republican thought relies on an essentially anthropological
conception of the polity as a kind of cultural group. Thus, far
from transcending the "social field" of cultural, value-laden
norms, official state law
is understood to be properly normative
116
and culturally rooted.
The second incorporation of pluralist thought into republicanism is expressed in the mandate that the official legal culture

Sunstein, Interest Groups](arguing that republicanism countenances a judicial examination of "public value justifications to see whether such justifications [are] in fact rooted
in, or [are] merely a disguise for, existing relations of power"); Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127,
130-38 [hereinafter Sunstein, Public Values] (propounding a republican argument for
more rigorous judicial scrutiny to flush out discriminatory stereotypes standing behind
apparently rational state interests). But see Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1612-21 (1988) (arguing that
Michelman's and Sunstein's republicanism cannot really be made to accommodate
minority interests because of republicanism's need for homogeneity); Sullivan, supra
note 83, at 1716-18 ("Affirming ongoing differences among involuntary groups appears
a fatal concession, undercutting the republican project of pursuing, even aspirationally,
a unitary common good."); Iris M: Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some
Implications of Feminist Critiquesof Moral and Political Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 57,66-67 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds.,
1987) ("[T]he idea of the civic public as expressing the general interest, the impartial
point of view of reason, itself results in exclusion."); Iris M. Young, Polity and Group
Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 251-54
(1989) [hereinafter Young, Polity and Group Difference] (arguing that the civic republican ideal of transcending private differences to achieve a common will is based on
norms derived from masculine experience and therefore requires homogeneity and
assimilation to male norms).
115. The assumption of a unitary state is usually so implicit that it is not even stated
in republican writing. It is clearly evident, however, for example, in Rousseau's republican vision of the homogeneous city-state. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAu, A Discourseon
the Origin of Inequality, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 27 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
1973) (1754). Other commentators have noticed the dependency of republicanism on
this assumption. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1713; Young, Polity and Group
Difference, supra note 114, at 251-55.
116. See Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 73 (1987) (noting that republicans view law as
.normative" and "constitutive of culture"); see also Michelman, supra note 72, at 1495
(referring to the historical association of republican politics with majority sentiments
about morality and arguing for a progressive version of republican politics which"involves
the ongoing revision of the normative histories that make political communities sources
of contestable value and self-direction for their members").
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not be "imperialist" in the sense of suppressing other cultures
or perspectives." 7 Like both legal and cultural pluralists,
contemporary civic republicans recognize the existence of cultural
groups outside the state and the importance of their role in the
formation and maintenance of values, norms, and personal
identity.""
Yet the civic republican attitude toward the relationship
between law and culture is murky. On one hand, modem civic
republicans see law as culturally constituted (a cultural form)
and culturally constitutive (an ingredient in forming the
culture)." 9 In this respect, civic republicans resemble legal
pluralists, who see law as a cultural system. (Both thus differ
from cultural pluralists, who are concerned less with the
anthropological conception of law than with interpreting the
content of official legal doctrine to reflect a recognition of group
rights.) On the other hand, civic republicanism diverges from
the legal pluralist vision of multiple sovereign legal cultures.
Civic republicanism ultimately is committed to a unitary polity,
a stance which, in order to reconcile cultural diversity with legal
centralism, leads to a focus on the vestigial perspectives, values,
and attenuated sense of a distinctive identity that persist after
the formal legal and political apparatuses of a separate culture
have atrophied.
Thus, civic republicanism, like cultural pluralism, has an
ingrained tendency to focus on the stuff of cultural "values,"
"traditions," and "perspectives," rather than on separate (and
separatist) legal sovereignties whose demands for autonomy are
more troublesome to mesh into one embracing system. 20 In this

117. For example, Michelman characterized Justice Stevens's opinion in Goldman
v. Weinbergeras an "imperial" stance. See Michelman, supranote 66, at 14. Michelman's
use of the term "imperial" is drawn from Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative. Cover
contrasts the "imperial" nature of the neutral, mediating principles of a liberal,
heterogeneous state with the "paideic" nature of flourishing, particularistic subgroups
contained within the state. See Cover, supra note 4, at 13-14; see also Michelman, supra
note 72, at 1495, 1499-1505 (advancing a vision of republican politics that is dialogic,
open to diversity, and inclusive).
118. See Michelman, supra note 72, at 1495; see also Sunstein, supra note 72, at
1539-41 (expressing concern about the practices of exclusion associated with
republicanism and proposing to overcome them).
119. See sources cited supra note 116.
120. For example, contrast Resnik's concern-exemplary of legal pluralism-with
juridical control and tribal sovereignty with Michelman's focus on the right of a Jew in
the U.S. military to wear a yarmulke. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 727-42; Michelman,
supra note 66, at 5-17. Or consider Weisbrod's interest in religious "legal systems,"
Weisbrod, Family, Church and State, supra note 66, at 746, particularly Weisbrod's
interest in religious juridical control over marriage and divorce, id. at 753-59. Compare
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scheme, individualism and assimilationism-rather than the
suppression of independent sovereignty-are seen as the chief
wrongs wrought by an imperialistic official law.
The rejection of individualism in favor of the view that values
are created and sustained in the context of a group has been a
traditional axiom of civic republicanism. 121 The renunciation of
assimilationism, however, represents a tenuous innovation in
civic republican thought. 122 This development is in tension with
the traditional civic republican commitment to the polity as the
primary norm-enunciating group. Like the cultural pluralists,
today's civic republicans suggest that this tension can be resolved
simply by having the norms of the primary group include the
perspectives of subgroups." 2 In this way, civic republicanism
looks at first glance like the cultural pluralists' national political
philosophy. However, the traditional civic republican emphasis
on the culture of the unitary polity requires more homogeneity
than the cultural pluralists (who abhor assimilation) would allow.
Notwithstanding this, a number of authors have suggested that
ajurisprudence based on a republican political philosophy, rather
than the prevailing liberal one, would be more receptive to the
claims of intermediate groups."2 In particular, Professor Tushnet
has proposed that a "reconstituted law of religion... draw[ing]
on... the republican tradition "1 25 would be more accommodating
of nonindividualist forms of religious life' 2 6-like, for example,
the Jewish kehilah. This argument begins with a critique of the
liberal conception of religion and intermediate institutions.

this withPost's interest- characteristic ofcultural pluralism -in "thevariousperspectives
of differing groups" in a multiethnic society. Post, supranote 4, at 303 (emphasis added).
121. See, eg., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract,in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
AND DISCOURSES, supra note 115, at 163, 172-75 (stating that the essence of the social
compact is that "[e]ach of us puts his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each
member as an indivisible part of the whole" (emphasis omitted)); see also ROUSSEAU, supra
note 115, at 41-42 (criticizing individualist accounts of the state of nature).
122. See Michelman, supra note 72, at 1506.
123. See id. at 1507. Michelman emphasizes a "version" of republicanism that is
"inclusory"and "plurality-protecting," while still contemplating citizenship in a unitary
polity. Id. at 1505-07. Michelman acknowledges that the "extension of the circle of
citizens to encompass genuine diversity greatly complicates republican thinking about
the relation between rights (or law) and politics." Id. at 1506. In a similar vein, Sunstein
marshals the civic republican tradition to support more searching review of legislative
and administrative acts that may reflect discrimination against groups. See Sunstein,
Interest Groups, supra note 114, at 68-75; Sunstein, Public Values, supra note 114, at
164-67.
124. See supra note 114.
125. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 702.
126. See id. at 735-38.
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Liberalism, according to this republican critique, cannot generate
a coherent law governing the relationship between religion and
state. 127 Instead, "[t]he liberal tradition accommodate[s] religion
by relegating it to the sphere of private life, a sphere whose
connections to public life [are] of essentially no interest."128 The
explanation of the nature of this "accommodation" precisely
parallels the historical explanation of the demise ofthe kehilah. 29
Tushnet explains that as political philosophers "developed
modern liberal theory, [they] saw a terrain in which attachment
to a universal nation-state had substantially reduced attachment
to local institutions and in which their [Protestant] theology
allowed them to remain believers30 while eliminating the church
as an intermediate institution."1
As described by republican critics of liberalism, the emergent
order of nation-states depended on a direct relationship between
the state and the individual,' 3 ' based on the extension of the
benefits of membership by the state in return for the individual's
political allegiance and obedience to legal state authority.
Intermediate associations representing alternative legal orders
constituted a direct threat to state sovereignty that had to be
neutralized. 3 2 The task of neutralization was facilitated by the
liberal redefinition of intermediate associations as being either
arms of the state or quintessentially private, voluntaristic assemblies, lacking any regulative function."3
The republican authors of this critique further suggest that
the autonomous or semiautonomous regulative subcommunity,
which is excluded (if not destroyed) by the liberal conception of
intermediate associations, would be better protected by a civic
republican jurisprudence." However, the different ways that
republicans have devised to situate subcommunities in the

127. Id. at 730-35.
128. Id. at 731-32.
129. See supra part I.
130. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 731.
131. Id. at 730.
132. Id. at 730-33.
133. Id. at 732. Tushnet describes three roles for the intermediate associations
permitted in a liberal order: "provid[ing] the matrix within which private preferences
are formed;" "serv[ing] as instruments of public policy;" and "being vehicles of alliance
among like-minded people." Id.; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1059,1070-73,1151-52 (1980) (assertingthatintermediateinstitutions
are defined from a liberal standpoint either as departments of the state or as purely
voluntary associations, and proposing an alternative conception of intermediate associations as semiautonomous regulative communities based on a mixture of civic republican
and medieval corporatist ideals).
134. See supra text accompanying note 126.

SPRING AND SUMMER

1992] The Case of the Jewish Kehilah

665

modern state do not solve, but simply overlook the fundamental
conflict between a unitary sovereignty and multiple normative
communities. Some adopt the legal pluralist recognition of the
legal and political dimensions of such communities and propose
a devolution of regulative power to local authorities135-an
arrangement reminiscent of the medieval corporatist order. The
preferred approach of civic republicans, however, has been
(implicitly) to maintain the supremacy of the official law of the
state, while elaborating doctrines, methods of interpretation, and,
more broadly, judicial attitudes which are supposed to be more
receptive to the claims of different cultures within the state.'3 6
This mode of civic republicanism resembles the cultural pluralist
aspiration for a national "pluralist law," which would entail
"ground rules by which diverse and potentially competitive
groups can
retain their distinct identities and yet continue to
" 37
coexist. "

By relying on such a concept, cultural pluralists and civic
republicans imply the possibility of resolving the conflict between
the order of the nation-state and a constellation of lesser
corporate orders, or between the imperatives of national
sovereignty and the survival of autonomous legal orders, like the
kehilah. Current revivalists now propose to dedicate the
republican tradition to the recognition of the regulative, norminculcating dimension of religious communities and to "fit" such
communities into the national order, by treating them as the
"location[s] for the inculcation" of the "civic responsibility and
a concern for the public interest" which are the hallmarks of
republican culture."3
In dedicating subcommunities to serve as training grounds for
participation in the national political community, however,
contemporary civic republicans slip into the same sort of thinking
for which they took liberals to task. After all, the idea of the
community as civic training ground is just another version of the
reconceptualization of the intermediate group as an arm of the
39
state-in this case as an informal branch of public education.

135. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 133, at 1149-54.
136. See Michelman, supra note 72, at 1495; text accompanying notes 106-07.
137. Post, supra note 4, at 302.
138. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 735-36.
139. See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1721 (asserting that "private voluntary groups
are poor ground for republican boot camps").
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The trouble is that the mere fact that both the republican
national culture and religious and ethnic subcultures are "legal"
as well as normative "fields" does not imply that the content of
their laws necessarily will correspond. Nor does it imply that
participation in one naturally will extend to participation in the
other."4 Although the "law" of an intermediate association and
the law of the polity do harmonize at times, this is likely a
fortuity or, even more likely, the result of relationships of
interdependence between the subgroup and the dominant culture
that produce "assimilation." The process of cultural assimilation
may or may not include overtly coercive interactions imposed
by the dominant society, such as forced conversions or the
discriminatory denial of benefits. But at the point where the
norms of the larger society are internalized by the subcommunity
so that the laws of both "harmonize," a process of assimilation
undoubtedly has occurred. .
This suggests that a basic conflict exists between the legal
pluralist recognition of conflicting sovereignties and a republican
vision of plural "cultures" glued together by assimilation. We
cannot have it both ways. The choice creates a dilemma for the
civic republicans and cultural pluralists who share the perception
that cultural assimilation is a harm that should not be countenanced by pluralist law. Either they must forego the commitment to the primacy of a unitary official law and embrace legal
pluralism and the feudalist consequences that it seems to entail;
or they must uphold that commitment by limiting the principle
of toleration to the vestigial "perspectives," "traditions," and other
badges of a largely assimilated identity; or, with a bit of a
legerdemain, they might embrace alternative legal cultures, but
only ones that are so marginal that they do not pose a realistic
threat to the sovereignty and essential homogeneity of the civic
4
state.1 1

140.

Barnard and Vernon also made this point:

The attribution of mediating properties to sectional groups rests either on a mistake
or an illusion. The theory is mistaken if it relies on the similarity of the processes
occurring at the sectional and general levels, for the resemblance of one level to
another tells us nothing about their actual relationship. It rests on an illusion
if... the mediation is demonstrated by reading into the groups beforehand those
properties which are presented as their products.
Barnard & Vernon, supra note 81, at 195.
141. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 723-29 (noting the marginality of a religion as
an indicator of a successful Free Exercise claim).
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The last is the approach followed in the few cases in which the
courts have deviated from the dominant individualist conception
of cultural and religious associations. In the areas of religion
and public education, for example, the courts have shown some
receptivity to the view that religious and national identity alike
depend on the generation and transmission of norms and values
by holistic communities.' 42 In adopting this position, courts
implicitly endorse the civic republican view that the state is a
cultural group and that official law is both constituted by and
constitutive of the "civic" culture. At the same time, religious
challenges to public education are the area in which the judiciary
has come closest to the pluralist recognition of the existence and
value of heterogeneous subgroups. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 43 the
Supreme Court went so far as to approximate the legal pluralist
view by accepting the primacy of a holistic religious tradition,
which "pervades and determines the entire mode of life of its
adherents," over a compulsory state education law.' 44 In Yoder,
the court protected the "free exercise" of the Old Order Amish
religion. But similar claims by religious groups less marginal
and less isolated than the Amish have not prevailed similarly."

142. The strongest recognition that the survival of a religious community depends
on the community's ability to inculcate its norms in its youth came in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
in which the Supreme Court granted the Amish an exemption from Wisconsin's
compulsory school law on the ground that it "interpose[d] a serious barrier to the
integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious community." 406 U.S. 205,211-12
(1972). The Court further observed that "the values and programs of the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish
religion." Id. at 217. The Supreme Court's recognition that the polity of the United States
itself is a community of values whose transmission is required in order for it to survive
is repeated in many cases. For example, in Westside Board of Education v. Mergens,
Justice Marshall asserted that the mission of encouraging participation in student
clubs-includingreligious clubs-"comports withthe Court's acknowledgment'thatpublic
schools are vitally important "in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens," and as vehicles for "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."'" 496 U.S. 226, 265 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,864 (1982) (quoting Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979))); see Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
683 (1986) ("The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example
the shared values of a civilized social order."); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is implicit in the history and character of
American public education that the public schools serve a uniquely public function[:]
the training ofAmerican citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist
influences of any sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage
common to all American groups and religions.").
143. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
144. Id. at 210.
145. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058,1070 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that the requirement that public school students use textbooks chosen
by school authorities does not create an unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise
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The courts also have recognized nominally the "sovereignty"
of Indian tribes."4 But this recognition must be qualified by the
relationship of dependence and domination that nevertheless
exists between the tribes and the federal government, 4 7 in the
same way that the judicial recognition of Amish legal and
religious autonomy must be qualified by its marginality.
Subgroups which are neither marginal (as are the Amish) nor
subordinated by an explicit hierarchical structure ofjurisdiction
(as in the case of Native Americans) have not been treated as
sovereign legal cultures, despite the fact that their "values" and
"customs" may receive occasional recognition.

CONCLUSION

Is cultural "preservation," without an ongoing commitment to
separate juridical authority or sovereignty, the most that
American constitutional law has to offer its subcommunities?
Is the demise of the medieval kehilah, or more saliently, the
failure of the New York Kehillah of this century, illustrative of
the levelling effect of the liberal order?
This Article has described how the transformation from
medieval corporatism to nation-state eviscerated the kehilah
form. The promises and imperatives of a liberal order were
incompatible with ongoing Jewish communal autonomy-as
Judah Magnes observed in the last years of the New York
experiment. 14' Jews themselves internalized some of the liberal
promises (equal citizenship) and imperatives (loyalty to the state).
At the same time, a combination of internal Jewish impulses and
external forces (for example, anti-Semitism) served to sustain
more than a vestige of an ongoing group affiliation-more indeed
than the nineteenth-century conception of Judaism as a
Religionsgemeinschaftallowed. Challenging the view of religion
as a voluntary confession of faith and free association of
individuals, a variety of modes of collective, secular Jewish

Clause), cert.denied,484 U.S. 1066(1988). For an extended analysis of Mozert in relation
to the question of assimilation in a pluralist society, see Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew
a Circlethat Shut Me Out.. ." Assimilation,Indoctrination,and the Paradoxofa Liberal
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 1993).
146. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 58, 63 (1978).
147. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 674.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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expression have surfaced in this century: Zionist, Diaspora
autonomist, and Yiddishist, to name only a few.
The persistence of Jewish communal expression should
sensitize us to the limitations of American constitutional
principles of tolerance, which are based on an unbroken boundary
dividing the public (legal/political) from the private (religious)
realm. Perhaps, as some have suggested, American constitutional
law should be reconstituted to accord greater autonomy to
religious and nonreligious legal-cultural "fields."4 s But despite
the intellectual allure of eliminating "false distinctions" between
public and private, religious and nonreligious realms, our
comparison of legal pluralist and cultural pluralist views suggests
that the protection of autonomous legal orders cannot be achieved
fully within the framework of a unitary national system of law.
Vestiges of such orders can survive and no doubt will survive
in a liberal regime. But to maintain that multiple legal orders
could be fully respected and protected is, as the legal pluralists
would surely point out, a pipe dream. The full protection of an
alternative legal culture only can be obtained at the price of
dismantling central political order, except in cases, like that of
the Amish, where the alternative order is extremely marginal
and insular. By contrast, more than a million New York Jews
in the 1920s hardly satisfy the criteria of marginality and
insularity. Nor would a revived kehilah in the future.
This example suggests why a system more sympathetic to such
communal forms not only is incompatible with our current
system, but also is, in certain ways, undesirable. The very
"harms" wrought by the ascendence of the liberal order-the
disintegration of the kehilah, assimilation, alienation-have
played a considerable role in reshaping modern Jewish identity.
Jewish culture is not a static entity, defined independently of
other cultures. It was not so even in the relatively insular
medieval kehilah form, which, after all, reflected the conception
of political and social order prevalent in the host society as much
as any "internal" religious doctrine. Indeed, Jewish culture
continually has been reconstituted by a mixture of influences and
forces emanating from both within and without. Hence, assimilation, understood broadly as adaptation to the host society, cannot
be regarded unambiguously as a harm, as the cultural pluralists

149.

See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
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and the civic republicans suggest. To do so only enforces a group
right to stasis-a stasis whose conditions, ironically, are defined
by an ephemeral set of authorities in response to a momentary
convergence of forces.

